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INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress launched a new assault on organized crime by
enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.' This
law, commonly known as RICO, promised a new era in which crime
would be prosecuted not simply as an isolated event, but rather as part of
an ongoing, illegal racket. Three decades later, the efficacy of RICO
remains in question. Proving the existence of a criminal organization
can be a complex and cumbersome task. It is not surprising, therefore,
that law enforcement has turned to more direct methods of attack.
One such method has been to develop new ways of spotting, prose-
cuting, and punishing money launderers. Money launderers are people
who make dirty money clean; who, to quote a U.S. government report,
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law; B.S., 1979, University
of Illinois; M.A., 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1986, Northwestern Univer-
sity. I would like to thank Bruce Zagaris for his comments on a draft of this article, and Angel K.
Leung, Blair Marlowe, and Gwen Young for their research assistance. A version of this article
was presented at a panel of the Association of American Law Schools, "RICO Thirty Years Later:
A Comparative Perspective," January 7, 2000.
1. The statute is included as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68) (1994).
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"concea[l] the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income,
and . . . disguis[e] that income to make it appear legitimate." 2
Money laundering investigations have been much in the news of
late. There have been stories that Radil Salinas de Gortari laundered
kickbacks from drug traffickers while his brother was President of Mex-
ico. 3 That Ferdinand Marcos stashed nearly half a billion dollars in
Swiss banks while he ruled the Philippines. 4 That two of Mexico's larg-
est banks have pleaded guilty to laundering charges stemming from a
controversial U.S. sting operation.5 That the former prime minister of
Ukraine pleaded guilty to Swiss charges that he laundered $9 million in
stolen funds, even as he faced U.S. charges of laundering $114 million.6
And, of course, that Russian organized crime networks laundered bil-
lions of dollars through the Bank of New York.7
Despite the new-found celebrity of the crime, laws against money
laundering have roots as long as those of RICO. This article will trace
those origins, after evaluating RICO. The article then will consider
whether domestic and international efforts to combat money laundering
provide better means than RICO for fighting organized crime. It will
demonstrate that anti-money-laundering laws themselves are complex
and burdensome, yet of dubious effectiveness. The article will recom-
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED
CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984). For a description of a typi-
cal money laundering cycle, see infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
3. See, e.g., Tim Golden, Saying Salinas Aided Traffickers, Swiss Seize $90 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at A3.
4. Elizabeth Olson, Ferdinand Marcos's Swiss Bank Legacy: Tighter Rules for Despots and
Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at A9.
5. See Tim Golden, 2 Mexican Banks to Plead Guilty in Laundering Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Golden, Mexican Banks]. The case proved controversial because U.S.
agents operated clandestinely on Mexican territory without having notified Mexican, or even U.S.
State Department, officials. See Tim Golden, U.S. Drug Sting Riles Mexico, Imperiling Future
Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al.
6. Ex-premier admits Ukraine theft role, S.F. EXAM., June 27, 2000, at A-3.
7. See, e.g., Timothy L. O'Brien & Raymond Bonner, Banker and Husband Tell of Role in
Laundering Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al [hereinafter O'Brien & Bonner, Banker and
Husband]; Michael R. Gordon, Russia Investigating Its Own Banks for Role in Suspicious Cash
Movements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A8; Timothy L. O'Brien & Raymond Bonner, 3 Face
Indictment in Federal Inquiry into Russian Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al [hereinafter
O'Brien & Bonner, Indictment]; John Tagliabue, Italians Say Russian Racket Is Linked to New
York Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1999, at Al; Michael R. Gordon & Neela Banerjee, Full Speed
Ahead in Fog of Russian Economy, Bank of New York Hit a Shoal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at
A6; Timothy L. O'Brien & Raymond Bonner, Russian Money-Laundering Investigation Finds a
Familiar Swiss Banker in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, § 1, at 12; Raymond Bonner &
Timothy L. O'Brien, Activity at Bank Raises Suspicions of Russia Mob Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.19,
1999, at Al [hereinafter Bonner & O'Brien, Activity at Bank].
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mend a new crime-fighting balance, one that accords due weight to the
privacy and other interests of law-abiding businesses and individuals.
I. ATTACKING RACKETEERING
Spurred by a Presidential commission that had chronicled deep in-
filtration of organized crime families into businesses, labor unions, and
other legitimate organizations, 8 Congress in 1970 enacted comprehen-
sive legislation to attack organized crime.9 The stated purpose of the
legislation was
to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by es-
tablishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime. 10
This Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act," often
called RICO, forbids a person to conduct an "enterprise" through, or
make use of income derived from, "a pattern of racketeering activity."' 2
Criminal conviction exposes a person to twenty years' imprisonment, a
fine, and forfeiture of property.' 3 RICO also permits civil suits; the lat-
ter may be brought not only by the federal government, but also by any-
one "injured in his business or property" because of a RICO violation. 14
Remedies for a civil violation include divestment, dissolution, and other
8. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 187, 192 (1969) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (describ-
ing methods of infiltration such as "monopolization" and "extortion," and characterizing the core
of organized crime as twenty-four "exclusively Italian" groupings). For events leading to appoint-
ment of this commission, see Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-53 (1982).
9. See 115 CONG. REC. 39,906 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (linking legislation that
became RICO to findings published in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8); see also Gerard E.
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 667 (1987)
(stating that the act of which RICO is a part "was largely based directly on the Commission's
recommendations") [hereinafter Lynch, RICO I & 11].
10. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994)).
11. See id. at 922.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) - (c) (1994). Conspiracy to engage in such conduct is also
prohibited. See id. § 1962(d) . A second predicate, engaging in similar activity related to "collec-
tion of an unlawful debt," likewise proscribed. See id. § 1962(a) - (c). This predicate is relatively
narrow and clear, and thus not as controversial as the "pattern of racketeering activity" predicate.
13. See id. § 1963(a). Although the maximum sentence ordinarily is twenty years, a defen-
dant may be sentenced to life if the "racketeering activity" that served as a predicate for convic-
tion itself permits a life sentence.
14. See id. § 1964(b), (c). A final judgment of conviction in a criminal court estops a defen-
dant to deny corresponding allegations in a civil suit. See id. § 1964(d).
2000]
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injunctive relief, and, in the case of private lawsuits, treble damages and
attorney's fees.' 5
RICO contains sweeping definitions of key statutory terms.' 6 An
"enterprise" refers to virtually any grouping, business or otherwise.1 7
"Racketeering activity" includes scores of state and federal offenses,
among them gambling, extortion, fraud, murder for hire, drug traffick-
ing, prostitution, and alien smuggling. 18 Commission of at least two
such acts within a ten-year period constitutes a "pattern of racketeering
activity."'19 Supreme Court efforts to define this last term - as "a series
of related predicates," as entailing "continuity plus relationship," and as
something more than two isolated acts2 0 - afford little clarity.
The elusive nature of these concepts has engendered criticism. A
decade ago, Professor Gerard E. Lynch acknowledged lower courts' re-
jections of claims that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, yet ques-
tioned whether "the values of legality for guidance of the citizen are
adequately served by a scheme in which prohibitions are clearly stated,
but unexpectedly severe penalties can be imposed." 2' Two years later,
in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Justice Scalia, joined
by three Justices, variously described the RICO statute as "enigmatic,"
"difficult to define," and "beyond me." 22 He contended that the Court's
effort at definition "increases rather than removes vagueness."2 3 The
15. See id. § 1964(a)-(c).
16. See Testimony of Gerard E. Lynch, on Civil RICO, Extortion, and Public Advocacy
Groups, 1998 WL 12762342 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Lynch Testimony] ("Because it is so
abstract and so broadly applicable, RICO has proven adaptable to virtually any form of criminal
activity. Political and labor corruption, business crime, organized criminal activity, terrorist
groups, and ordinary violent crime have been prosecuted using the RICO statu[t]e.").
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994) ("'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity"). See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)
(broadly defining "enterprise" to include any "group of persons associated together for a common
purpose ... in a course of conduct"); Lynch Testimony, supra note 16 ("An 'enterprise' under
RICO can be almost any structured activity, legal or illegal, formal or informal: a corporation, a
labor union, a government office, a Mafia family, a l[a]w practice, a civil rights organization, a
church or just a group of people, loosely affiliated with each other, who sha[re] a common goal.").
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
19. See id. § 1961(5).
20. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1989) (defiiing "pat-
tern" as "a series of related predicates" over time); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
497 n.14 (1985) (stating that "two isolated acts of racketeering do not constitute a pattern," and,
citing legislative history, stressing importance of "'continuity plus relationship"' (emphasis in
original)).
21. Lynch, RICO I & I1, supra note 9, at 717-20.
22. 492 U.S. at 251, 253, 255 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Kennedy,
JJ., concurring in judgment).
23. Id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has not entertained a vague-
ness challenge to RICO.
202
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majority, however, found the "absence of any textual identification" of
"pattern" to be nothing more than a demonstration of Congress's "flexi-
ble approach." 24
The Court has accorded RICO capacious scope. Although RICO
was aimed at organized crime,25 less than 10 percent of RICO indict-
ments filed in the first fifteen years involved a criminal organization's
use of techniques like extortion to corrupt a legitimate business. 26 In-
deed, Professor Lynch has stated that prosecutors have exercised re-
straint in the use of criminal RICO.2 7 At the same time, the Court
approved a broader use of RICO, one that reaches beyond the organized
crime context. Thus, even as the Court acknowledged that RICO's "ma-
jor purpose ...is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime,"28 it held that a RICO "enterprise" may be an illegiti-
mate as well as a legitimate business. 29 It interpreted RICO's criminal
forfeiture provision liberally, to serve a "broader goal.., to remove the
profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishon-
est gains."' 30 The Court further has permitted civil litigants to invoke the
statute in myriad contexts unrelated to classic notions of organized
crime. A notable example is National Organization for Women v.
Scheidler, in which the Court sustained the use of RICO to challenge
anti-abortion protesters even though the defendants had no economic
24. Id. at 238.
25. See Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from Civil
RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 35 (1996) ("RICO's goal was to eliminate the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into businesses, labor unions, and other legitimate organizations operating
in interstate commerce." (citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
26. See Lynch, RICO I & II, supra note 9, at 726-28 (stating that less than 8 percent of
indictments in reported decisions in first fifteen years alleged infiltration of legitimate businesses,
and that in "only a handful" was the infiltrator a classic criminal organization); see also Abrams,
supra note 25, at 52-53 (stating that only 9 percent of civil RICO decisions before 1985 "involved
'allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals,' such
as arson, bribery, commercial bribery, embezzlement, extortion, gambling, theft, and political cor-
ruption") (quoting REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF
CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985)). Accord L. Gordon Crovitz, RICO's Broken Com-
mandments, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 26, 1989 (alleging that federal prosecutors had violated internal
rules and used RICO in mail fraud and tax cases and as a tool to prod plea bargaining, coerce
testimony, and accomplish pretrial forfeitures).
27. Lynch Testimony, supra note 16 (stating that civil RICO "has been subject to greater
abuse" in part because although "the Justice Department, in the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion, has had a pretty good record of refusing to apply RICO to its fullest possible literal extent ,..
private lawyers representing potential plaintiffs have no obligation or incentive to show similar
restraint").
28. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
29. See id. at 580-81.
30. Russello v. United States. 464 U.S. 16. 28 (1983).
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motive for their conduct. 3' In the wake of such decisions, employment,
health-care, securities, and product-liability suits often allege RICO
violations .32
There is some support for these developments. 33 But there is con-
cern as well. Critics have decried RICO's transmutation of state into
federal offenses. 34 They have worried that the blending of civil and
criminal RICO improperly permits civil defendants to be branded with
the stigma of criminal behavior. 35 They have complained that the attrac-
tion of treble damages has spawned frivolous and inappropriate civil
suits. 36 One judge has called civil RICO "a recurring nightmare for fed-
eral courts.."37
A cause of headaches, although perhaps not nightmares, is RICO's
complexity. A RICO offense is compound: the prosecution first must
prove an underlying crime, then that the crime was committed in a statu-
31. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
32. See, e.g., Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) (discussing RICO allegations in
suit against health insurer); Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) (treating dairy farm-
ers' RICO suit against the manufacturer of a silo in which their feed spoiled); Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (discussing civil securities fraud suit containing RICO allegations);
Elwyn Berton Spence, The Improper Civil RICO Claim: If Such a Thing Exists, Can It Be Battled
With Sanctions?, 51 ALA. LAW. 290, 292-93 (Sept. 1990) (commenting on various types of civil
RICO suits).
33. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 920, 983-84 (1987) [hereinafter Lynch, RICO III & IV] (offering some
"favorable conclusions" that criminal RICO had not been frequently abused and that it had filled
"some serious gaps in the federal penal code"); Blakey, supra note 8, at 341-49 (approving of civil
RICO as means to enforce insufficiently prosecuted laws against fraud). Cf Sedima, 473 U.S. at
499 ("[T]he fact that RICO was been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disparaging RICO for
"validat[ing] the federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds"), quoted in H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing this trend in particular be-
cause of the amorphous nature of RICO's statutory terms). Cf Lynch, RICO I & I, supra note 9,
at 714 (stating that RICO may be said to have "swallowed" much of the federal and state penal
codes). But cf Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87 (concluding that Congress intended to "alter the
balance between federal and state enforcement of criminal law," and that Congress had acted
within its power).
35. See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 849-
50 (1990). But see Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 ("As for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves no
greater stain than do a number of other civil proceedings.").
36. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that RICO "quite
simply revolutionizes private litigation"), quoted in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (criticizing this trend). Accord Lynch Testimony, supra note 16 (discussing
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994), and noting that Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy had opposed RICO in 1970 out of fear that it could be used against "legitimate
dissenters").
37. In re the Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liability Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D. Colo.
1987).
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torily defined manner. 38 This construction is not new to RICO. The
Hobbs Act of 1948, an early attempt at federal regulation of organized
crime, requires proof not only that a defendant committed robbery or
extortion, but also that she did so with the particular effect of obstructing
commerce. 39 RICO, however, is more complicated. It requires a jury
first to find that the defendant has committed the requisite pattern of
offenses. Only after this predicate is established may the jury turn to
consider whether the defendant's conduct of an enterprise, or use of in-
come derived from an enterprise, was sufficiently linked to this pattern.
Because of this complexity, RICO entails protracted investigations that
result in long, confusing trials, 40 culminating in long, confusing jury
instructions. 4'
As if these concerns were not enough, some argue that RICO may
not be effective against the sort of organized crime that Congress had
contemplated.4 2 In part, this may be because organized crime has
shifted away from the relatively stable crime "families" to loose and
ever-changing amalgamations of individuals. 43 Finally, critics question
38. Proof of predicates allows guilt under RICO, as well as for substantive offenses; none-
theless, it has been deemed not to create a double jeopardy problem. See Dorean Marguerite
Koenig, The Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L.
REV. 1351, 1359-60 (1998).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b) (1994). The Hobbs Act superseded the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934, formerly at 18 U.S.C. §§ 420a-429e, which contained similar language. See 31A
AM. JUR. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 74 (1989).
40. See Koenig, supra note 38, at 1360 (describing claim of veteran defense lawyer that what
once would have been a short state trial on prostitution charges had, by dint of RICO, metamor-
phosed into a month-long federal trial); see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579 (noting that RICO trial
had lasted six weeks).
41. See Lynch Testimony, supra note 16 ("The very broad and very abstract definitions of
the crime make it possible, especially in conspiracy prosecutions, to tie together numerous defend-
ants, and very different sorts of predicate acts, committed in different places at different times,
into a single prosecution, with the attendant risk that juror[s] will be confused and overwhelmed
by the evidence, and convict, by association, individuals who would never be convicted if they
had to be tried for specific, concrete crimes").
42. See Lynch, RICO I & II, supra note 9, at 726 (stating that "RICO has been a nearly total
failure as a weapon against the kind of activity that led Congress to enact it"; that is, against the
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime); Crovitz, supra note 26 (describing New
York criminal RICO case lost for lack of proof, and concluding that 'just as RICO is expanding to
cover disputes with legitimate business concerns, prosecutors are finding RICO ineffective against
organized crime").
43. An agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has written that this new type
of criminal grouping makes it difficult to use RICO against firearms traffickers:
A major problem in conducting RICO investigations is not so much proving the predicate
crime but establishing the group organizational structure. Groups dealing in firearms and
other criminal activities do not appear as rigidly organizzd and structured as a traditional
organized crime family or outlaw motorcycle gang. These groups appear to constantly
combine, disband, and recombine, not necessarily with the same individuals, which causes
difficulty in determining group structure and personnel.
2000]
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whether the statute is a necessary crime-fighting tool. The predicate acts
themselves are substantive crimes,44 which are often pleaded and proved
in the same case, 45 often more easily than the RICO counts.46 Nor is
RICO any longer needed to secure harsh federal punishment. Federal
criminal jurisdiction now includes what once were state offenses, 47 and
maximum sentences for many substantive crimes have been increased. 48
Given these criticisms, a more focused attack on illegal conduct of
organized criminals would seem to hold more promise.
II. A NARROWER APPROACH: FOLLOW THE MONEY
One way to attack organized crime more directly is to follow the
money. Those who make crime their livelihood must find ways to use
the profits of their illegal conduct. 49 This is not as easy as it may seem.
A federal prosecutor commented, "'The major problem the cocaine traf-
fickers have is not getting the drugs into the country. It's getting the
money out.'- 50 Criminals must engage in money laundering, 51 a term
that, according to one version, derived from the Mafia's Prohibition-Era
Joseph P. Greco, Pattern Crimes: Firearms Trafficking Enforcement Techniques, FBI LAW ENF.
BULL. 6, 13 n.8 (Sept. 1998).
44. Accord Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 213, 257 (1984) (asserting that "RICO has virtually never been used in a case which was
not reachable by other statutes").
45. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579 (stating that defendant had been convicted of one
RICO count, plus eight counts alleging substantive offenses for the same conduct named as RICO
predicate offenses).
46. Cf Peter J. Henning, Individual Liability for Conduct by Criminal Organizations in the
United States, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1305, 1328-29 (1998) (describing varied levels of intent prose-
cutors must prove in order to secure RICO conviction).
47. See Lynch, RICO III & IV, supra note 33, at 923 ("Theft, arson, extortion, prostitution,
gambling, and of course narcotics trafficking, are all covered by federal statutes."); Lynch Testi-
mony, supra note 16 ("where RICO was once a vehicle to gain federal jurisdiction over the cor-
ruption of state and local public officials, there are now federal statutes that directly penalize such
conduct, and RICO is no longer necessary").
48. See Lynch Testimony, supra note 16 ("Unlike the situation in 1970, or even in the
1980's, with the adoption of enhanced fines and the federal sentencing guidelines, penalties for
white collar offenses ar[e] today adequate, and there is no need for RICO to enhance them in
particular cases").
49. See U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, U.N. Economic and
Social Council, E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.5, quoted in U.N. DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION,
WORLD DRUG REPORT 1997 136 (1997) (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/
world drug-report 1997/CH4/4.6pdf> [hereinafter U.N. DRUG REPORT] (tracing the need to laun-
der illegal proceeds to "the desire of criminals both to conceal the crime which generated those
proceeds, and to be able to enjoy them").
50. Christopher S. Wren, Business Schemes Change the Dynamics of the Drug War, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1996, at § 1, p. 42 (quoting Marion Percell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Newark).
51. See U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 136 ("[M]oney laundering is a vital compo-
nent of all financially motivated crime.").
206
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practice of mixing illegal profits with money that laundromats had
earned legally. 52 And while adept leaders of criminal organizations may
insulate themselves from much criminal activity, eventually they must
come in contact with the laundered funds. 53
It is estimated that between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion are laun-
dered each year throughout the world.5 4 U.S. officials, in particular, at-
tribute much of this money to drug trafficking.55  Sociologist Manuel
Castells has written that "about half of the laundered money, at least in
the case of the Sicilian Mafia, is reinvested in legitimate activities." 56 In
an observation that echoes congressional concerns that led to passage of
RICO, he added, "This continuity between profits from criminal activi-
ties and their investment in legitimate activities makes it impossible to
limit the economic impact of global crime to the former, since the latter
play a major role in ensuring, and covering up, the overall dynamics of
the system." 57
It seems logical that if law enforcement can hinder this process by
which criminals make their dirty money clean, it can hinder criminals
themselves.5 8 On this premise, governments have endeavored, on both
the domestic and the international fronts, to create such a hindrance.
52. See ANDREW MITCHELL ET AL., CONFISCATION 218 (1992).
53. See David A. Chaikin, Money Laundering as a Supranational Crime: An Investigatory
Perspective, in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 415,
420-21 (Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992) ("Those at the top of the organization are insu-
lated from the physical acts of the crime. The criminal leaders are extremely difficult to investi-
gate, let alone prosecute. It is the money trail which often represent[s] the only link between the
leaders of the criminal organization and the crime itself."); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Unlaundering
Dirty Money Abroad: US Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 U. MIAMI IN-
TER-AM. L. REV. 33, 34 (1986).
54. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Basic Facts about Money
Laundering (last modified Aug. 11, 2000) <http://www.oecd/fatf/Mlaunderingen.htm>.
55. See Barry R. McCaffrey, Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 20 Lov. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 791 (1998) (stressing the role anti-money-laundering laws play in the U.S. fight
against drug trafficking); Wren, supra note 50 (quoting U.S. Customs official that 90 percent of
the estimated $10 billion laundered annually through the New York City metropolitan area comes
from drugs, the rest from tax evasion, extortion, or illegal gambling). A U.N. report takes a
broader view: "Money laundering is not linked exclusively to the illicit drug industry, rather it is a
necessary step in almost any criminal venture that yield[s] profits." U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra
note 49, at 136.
56. MANUEL CASTELLS, END OF MILLENNIUM 169 (1998).
57. Id. at 169-70. See also U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 136 (stating that criminal
organizations often aim to "manipulate their illicit proceeds ... through the legitimate financial
sector"); William C. Gilmore, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY
LAUNDERING at ix, x (W.C. Gilmore ed., 1992) (same); PETRUS C. VAN DUYNE, ORGANIZED
CRIME IN EUROPE 113 (1996) (same).
58. See Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 34 ("[I]nsofar as criminals ... act as they do for the
money, the best deterrent and punishment is to confiscate their incentive.").
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A. Domestic Efforts
1. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
The same year that it passed RICO, Congress enacted the Bank
Secrecy Act, often called the BSA, 59 an early move against the conver-
sion of ill-gotten gains. 60 Departing from the common-law tradition that
declines to criminalize failures to act,61 the BSA requires banks and
other "financial institutions" to file with the U.S. government Currency
Transaction Reports, or CTRs, on cash transactions involving more than
$10,000.62 It authorizes civil as well as criminal actions; however, un-
like RICO, which permitted private civil actions, the BSA allows only
the U.S. government to bring such actions. Civil remedies include in-
junctions, fines, and forfeiture. 63 Willful violations are deemed crimes,
although initially they were punishable by no more than five years in
prison.64
The BSA is not precisely an anti-money-laundering law. 65 It fo-
cuses on financial institutions rather than on the individuals who use
them, and it requires reports even of legally obtained cash. Yet it aims
59. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended
primarily at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (1994)).
60. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (describing congres-
sional intent to stop "serious and widespread use of foreign financial institutions" to violate U.S.
laws); Koenig, supra note 38, at 1375 (stating that the BSA was "passed in 1970 in response to the
increased use of financial institutions to launder 'unreported income and illegally obtained' mon-
eys") (quoting David J. Elbaz et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665, 685
(1997)).
61. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTiN W. Sco-r, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 202-12 (2d
ed. 1986) (describing "traditional Anglo-American position" that limits criminal liability for fail-
ure to act to "certain narrowly-defined categories," among them statutorily imposed duties); see
generally Matthew R. Hall, Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money
Laundering and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 Ky. L.J. 643 (1996).
62. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994) (establishing reporting requirement); 31 C.F.R. 103.29
(1999) (setting amount at $10,000). The BSA's initial focus reflected the view that, as one article
put it, "Cash is the medium of exchange for the underground economy." Steven Biskupic & Eric
J. Klumb, 10 Things to Know about the Federal Money Laundering Law, 67 Wis. L. REv. 12, 12
(1994). Since 1990, however, the Treasury Secretary has required financial institutions to main-
tain logs of monetary instruments, such as cashier's checks, traveler's checks, and money orders,
of more than $3,000. See Testimony of John J. Byrne for the American Bankers Association
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcommittee on
General Oversight and Investigations Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, Regarding The Bank Secrecy Act and Bank Reporting, available in 1999 WL
16946435 (Apr. 20, 1999).
63. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317, 5320, 5321 (1994).
64. Pub. L. 91-508, §§ 205(b), 209, 210, 84 Stat. 1121. Cf infra text accompanying note 71
(discussing current criminal penalties).
65. The BSA's stated purpose is to aid all "criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings." 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1994).
[Vol. 27:199
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to help regulate money laundering by creating a paper trail through
which launderers might be traced.
Creation of such a trail has come at a cost. Notwithstanding its
name, the Bank Secrecy Act outlawed the tradition, common in the
United States and abroad, by which banks kept information about their
customers private.66 CTRs require a bank to report not only the nature
and amount of transaction, but also the name, address, telephone num-
ber, Social Security number, occupation, and date of birth of the cus-
tomer.67 The Supreme Court rejected arguments that these requirements
were unduly burdensome or invasive. 68
The BSA's benefits, meanwhile, were not immediately apparent.
As a measure to fight organized crime, it was patently overinclusive, for
many CTRs reported legitimate transactions. At first banks seldom
complied with the BSA's requirements, moreover, and enforcement was
mired in litigation and bureaucracy. 69 Investigations that were launched
sometimes failed, in part because the BSA imposed the obligation to
report on banks rather than on individuals. 70
There have been attempts to strengthen the BSA. Failure to report
was made a felony punishable by as much as ten years' imprisonment
for willful violations. 71 Causing a bank to fail to file a required report,
and structuring a transaction to avoid such filing, also were made
crimes.72 Financial institutions were required to keep records of infor-
mation on all persons involved in cash transactions of as little as
$3,000.73 The definition of "financial institution" was broadened,74 and
other businesses, including law firms, were required to file analogous
66. See Richard T. Preiss, Privacy of Financial Information and Civil Rights Issues: The
Implications for Investigating and Prosecuting International Economic Crime, 14 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 525, 528-30 (1996) (discussing traditions of financial privacy in United States and elsewhere).
67. See Currency Transaction Report, Treasury Form 4789 (on file with author).
68. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47-49, 61 (1974).
69. See Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 36.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing convictions for
conspiracy to conceal material facts from the Internal Revenue Service on the ground that the
BSA did not require defendant customers to inform banks that they were making numerous cur-
rency transactions of less than $10,000).
71. See Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1000 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1994) (allowing imprisonment of up to ten years and fine of up
to $500,000 for willful violations occurring along with another federal offense or "as part of a
pattern of any illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period")).
72. This amendment comprised Section 1354(a) of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-570, tit. I, 100 Stat. 3207-22, (Oct. 27, 1986), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 78-101. It is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994). Conviction under this new provision
exposes a defendant to up to five years for a single violation and up to ten years for "a pattern of
any illegal activity involving more than $100,000" in a year. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c) (1994).
73. 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1994).
2000]
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reports.7 5 CTR filing requirements were relaxed in favor of require-
ments that banks file, with a single federal agency, only reports on suspi-
cious activities.76 The government worked with banks to institute know-
your-customer and other internal compliance programs. 77
Even so, the BSA has failed to satisfy the need for a direct attack
on the laundering, and launderers, of dirty money.
2. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
Sandwiched between the Hobbs Act and RICO in the U.S. Code are
the laws aimed squarely at money launderers. The Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, or MLCA, focuses on criminal proceedings, which
may result in punishment of up to twenty years in prison, hefty fines,
and forfeiture, 78 although there are some provisions for civil fines and
forfeitures. 79 Rather than subsume all money laundering under one um-
brella, as RICO does with racketeering, the MLCA divides activity into
four categories: transaction money laundering, transportation money
laundering, and sting operations, proscribed in Section 1956, and spend-
ing of laundered property, proscribed in Section 1957.
Each of these categories entails similar elements. Both the transac-
tion money laundering and sting categories of Section 1956 take aim at
the conduct of "financial transactions," broadly defined as any convey-
ance, 80 not only of cash, but also of monetary instruments or real prop-
74. Id. § 5322 (a)(2) (defining "financial institution" to include dozens of businesses, rang-
ing from traditional banks to pawnbrokers, businesses that sell vehicles, and the U.S. Postal
Service).
75. Pursuant to the Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, Div. A, tit. I, § 146(a), 98 Stat. 685-86 (July
18, 1984) (codified as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 60501). Treasury Form 8300 must be filed by "[a]ny
person ... engaged in a trade or business"-including lawyer-who receives $10,000 or more in
cash in one or several related transactions within a. year.
76. See Michael Allen, U.S. to Cut Bank Reports on Cash Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
1998, at A3 [hereinafter Allen, U.S. to Cut] (stating that under new U.S. Treasury regulations,
banks no longer must report cash transactions with most commercial customers); see also 31
C.F.R. § 103.21(a)(2) (1999) (requiring filing of Suspicious Activity Report if bank knew or
should have known that transaction was undertaken to evade BSA rules or with illegal proceeds,
or had no apparent lawful purpose).
77. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (1994) (authorizing Treasury Secretary to require financial in-
stitutions to develop such "anti-money laundering programs").
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (a)(2) (1994) (permitting twenty years' incarceration and
fines of up to $500,000 or double value of the property involved, if that exceeds $500,000); 18
U.S.C. § 982 (allowing criminal forfeiture of any property related to the offense). Accord id.
§ 1956(a)(3) (stating that punishment may include up to twenty years' imprisonment and a fine
"under this title"); cf. id. § 1957(b) (limiting incarceration for a violation of Section 1957 to ten
years and fines).
79. See id. §§ 981, 984 (civil forfeiture); id. § 1956(b) (civil fines).
80. "Transaction" is defined to include any:
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erty,81 by means of a financial institution. Transportation money
laundering focuses narrowly on the movement of monetary instruments
into or out of the United States,8 2 while the spending statute focuses on
"monetary transactions" via financial institutions.83
All three categories set forth in Section 1956 forbid actions taken
with specified states of mind. A defendant must intend "to promote the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity," 84 or, alternatively, know or
intend either to conceal the nature of the proceeds 85 or avoid a state or
federal transaction reporting requirement.86 The defendant must know
or believe that the funds or property involved has an illegal taint.87 Sec-
purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect
to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, ex-
change or currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certifi-
cate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or any other
payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution...
Id. § 1956(c)(3).
81. Id. § 1956(c)(4) (defining "financial transaction" as a transaction that itself affects inter-
state commerce or that uses a financial institution having that effect, if it involves wire transfers,
monetary instruments, or real property or vehicles).
82. Id. § 1956(a)(2) (1981). The statute defines "monetary instruments" to include U.S. or
other countries' currency, checks, money orders, investment securities, and bearer bonds. See
id.§ 1956(c)(5). It forbids not only physical movement, but also transmission or transfer by elec-
tronic means, of such instruments. See id, § 1956(a)(2); see also United States v. Monroe, 943
F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1991) (sustaining conviction for electronic transfer), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
971 (1992).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1994) (defining "monetary transaction" to mean all deposits,
withdrawals, transfers, or exchanges of funds via financial institutions).
84. Id. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(2)(A), 1956(a)(3)(A).
85. Id. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B) (prohibiting activity with knowledge that it "is
designed in whole or in part ... to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity"); § 1956(a)(3) (prohibit-
ing activity with "intent" so to conceal).
86. Id. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (forbidding activity with knowledge that it is
designed "in whole or in part . . . to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law"); § 1956(a)(3)(C) (forbidding activity with "intent" to avoid such a requirement).
The transaction money laundering category adds an additional proscribed state of mind, the intent
to violate U.S. tax laws. See id. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(ii).
87. Id. § 1956(a)(1) (requiring that the defendant "kno[w] that the property ... represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity," and that the transaction "in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity"); § 1956(a)(2) (requiring intent to promote specified un-
lawful activity or knowledge of illegality); § 1956(a)(3) (stating that property must have been
"represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or ... used to conduct or facilitate
specified unlawful activity" by a law enforcement officer or agent).
For a conviction under Section 1956(a), the government needs only to prove that the defen-
dant knew the source of the money was felonious, not that the defendant knew the precise nature
of the unlawful activity. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513 (2d Cir. 1997). The
government satisfies its burden, moreover, by showing the likely, as opposed to actual source, of
money. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming money-
laundering conviction supported by evidence that defendant engaged in drug transactions around
the time he purchased cars for cash).
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tion 1957 requires no specific intent, simply proscribing knowing en-
gagement in monetary transactions that involve property derived from
specified unlawful activity. 88
The concept of "specified unlawful activity" is vast. It incorporates
virtually everything considered a "racketeering activity" under RICO,8 9
but does not stop there. "Specified unlawful activity" further comprises
drug trafficking, violent crimes, and fraud committed overseas; 90 and
scores of other crimes, ranging from espionage to food stamp fraud. 9'
Like RICO, therefore, the MLCA makes a conviction for the stated of-
fense, money laundering, contingent on proof of a statutory predicate.92
There is no need to prove any pattern, however; each act of money laun-
dering constitutes a separate offense. 93
Much hinges on proof of states of mind, proof that may be easier to
secure than it first might appear. Circumstantial evidence is permitted,
so that jurors are likely to convict if the government can characterize
transactions as unusual or suspicious. 94 Moreover, jurors may convict if
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1994). The property must be worth more than $10,000. See id.
Although a violation of Section 1957 thus should be easier to prove than one of Section 1956,
prosecutors have exercised restraint in use of the former, perhaps out of fear of public backlash if
the statute were routinely used against merchants. See Emily J. Lawrence, Let the Seller Beware:
Money Laundering, Merchants, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 33 B.C. L. REv. 841, 872 (1992).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (1994) (defining "specified unlawful activity" to include all
racketeering offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), except for Bank Secrecy Act violations).
90. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(B).
91. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(C)-(F). For examples of the variety of offenses on which money laun-
dering convictions may be based, see, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284, (7th Cir.) (hold-
ing that prostitution qualifies as a specified unlawful activity), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 909 (1996);
United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that smuggling of salmon into the
United States is a specified unlawful activity).
92. See Henning, supra note 46, at 1329 (noting the similarly compound structures of the
two statutes). Reversal of conviction for the underlying offenses does not preclude conviction for
money laundering. See United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120 (5th Cir.) (sustaining Section 1956
convictions despite reversal of mail fraud convictions, on ground that Section 1956 only requires
that the subject transaction involve the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, and the indict-
ment's specification of the unlawful activity as "mail fraud" was sufficient), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
960 (1997).
93. See United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the money laun-
dering statutes bar individual acts, not a course of action).
94. As examples of circumstantial proof of knowledge elements, see United States v. Long,
977 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that car dealer knew buyer listed false job on credit applica-
tion, paid under table, and lied to grand jury); United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding that unusual payroll scheme and business dealings permitted jurors to find defen-
dant knew dealings designed to conceal drug proceeds); United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377
(7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the defendant's careful engineering of laundering scheme made
no sense unless defendant knew the money was illegal proceeds); United States v. Massac, 867
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's transfers of cash to Haiti via fellow Haitian,
rather than bank, showed she knew the transactions were designed to conceal drug proceeds). As
an example of circumstantial proof of intent, see United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th
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they conclude the defendant did not actually know, but was willfully
blind to whether the money was tainted.95 Banks and other corporations
may be held liable for the aggregate knowledge or willful blindness of
their employees. 96 Indeed, those who do business with criminals are as
much a target of these anti-money-laundering laws as are criminals
themselves. 97 A merchant who has no personal desire to conceal illegal
proceeds thus is guilty of money laundering if she knew, or avoided
knowledge, that the customer's motive was concealment. 98
The MLCA includes two novel features. First, it explicitly autho-
rizes sting operations. 99 Second, it explicitly prescribes sweeping extra-
territorial jurisdiction. A U.S. citizen may be prosecuted for money
laundering wherever it takes place. Noncitizens face prosecution under
Section 1956 as long as "the conduct occurs in part in the United
States." 100 Both features give the act a decidedly modem flavor. Proac-
Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction of defendant based on circumstantial evidence of "intent to pro-
mote a fraudulent scheme exists" by using transfers to Austria to "len[d] an 'aura of legitimacy' to
the scheme"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1136 (1996).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720 (7th Cir.) (affirming money-laun-
dering conviction by guilty plea of used-car dealer, and stating that due process permitted statute
to be applied against the dealer on a theory of willful blindness), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 919
(1992). See also Henning, supra note 46, at 1330-31 (discussing willful blindness approach in
money-laundering context). A typical willful blindness instruction tells jurors that they may find
that a defendant acted "knowingly" if "the defendant was aware of a high probability" that an act
was illegal, "and deliberately avoided learning the truth." MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH CIR.
§ 5.7 (1997).
96. See, e.g., United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that corporations may be liable on willful blindness theory if employee deliberately avoids
investigating facts behind suspicious transaction); United States v. Bank of New England, 821
F.2d 844 (1st Cir.) (holding bank had requisite knowledge, through the aggregate knowledge of its
employees that a customer had tendered several less-than-$9,000 checks, for willful violation of
reporting requirements), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
97. See H.R. REP. No. 99-855, at 14 (1986) ("It is time for us to tell the local trafficker and
everyone else, 'If you know that person is a trafficker and has this income derived from the
offense, you better beware of dealing with that person.'") (statement of Rep. Lungren).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.) (holding merchant liable based
on permissible inference that he knew buyers wanted to disguise their identity), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1015 (1995); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding real
estate broker liable under Section 1956 because she knew of purchaser's illegal purpose), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 938 (1993); Henning, supra note 46, at 1329-31.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (1994).
100. Id. § 1956(0; see id. § 1957(d). The few reported opinions treating the question have
endorsed extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering. See United States v. Approximately
$25,829,681.80 in Funds (Plus Interest) in the Court Registry Investment System, No. 98 Civ.
2682 (LMM), 1999 WL 1080370, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that "the parties initiating the fund transfers 'acted
electronically' within the United States"); United States v. Stein, No. Crim. A. 93-375, 1994
WL285020 (E.D. La. June 23, 1994) (relying on Section 1956(0, denies motion to dismiss prose-
cution of British defendant who never entered the United States, but allegedly aided electronic
transfers between London and New Orleans).
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tive investigations like sting operations are a favorite of contemporary
law enforcement,10 1 and assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over extraterrito-
rial crimes is on the increase. 102
B. International Efforts
It is inevitable that laws against money laundering should cross na-
tional borders, for the crime itself is international.10 3 The Bank of New
York affair, for example, may have involved the laundering of the pro-
ceeds of arms trafficking, tax fraud, extortion, and prostitution through
as many as forty countries. 1°4 A typical money laundering scheme in-
volves three phases - "placement," "layering," and "integration" - each
of which has a cross-border component.10 5 During the placement phase,
illegal proceeds are consolidated - often by filtering through a casino, a
restaurant, or other high-cash-volume front business 106 - then sent
Although it did not involve a challenge to jurisdiction, United States v. Banque Leu, S.A.,
CR 93 0607 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 1993) (plea agreement), exemplifies the extent to which extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction may be exercised. There a Luxembourg bank with no U.S. office pleaded
guilty to money laundering, on a willful blindness theory, as a result of is acceptance, in Luxem-
bourg, of non-U.S. citizens' deposits of two Bank of America cashier's checks. See Kirk W.
Munroe, Surviving the Solution: The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States, 14 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 505, 520-21 (1996) (discussing case); Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the
Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 202 n.369 (1995).
101. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1413-14 (1998) (describing trend toward proactive
policing).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming conviction
of former bank employees for overseas laundering of funds from the United States); United States
v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir.) (holding that U.S. national could be convicted of
violating child pornography statutes even if acts were committed outside the United States), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990) (permit-
ting United States to prosecute captain of vessel seized in high seas for drug trafficking), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991).
103. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 57, at xi (citing a recent Canadian estimate that more
than 80 percent of money laundering is transnational); U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 141-
42 (calling "internationalization" a "major trend" in money laundering); VAN DUYNE, supra note
57, at 117 (stating that money laundering "without a 'foreign loop"' is difficult); Chaikin, supra
note 53, at 431 (noting that because currency and markets now are international, money launder-
ing is likely to involve more than one state).
104. See Timothy L. O'Brien & Lowell Bergman, Law-Enforcement Rivalry in U.S. Slowed
Inquiry on Russian Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A1; Tagliabue, supra note 7; Bonner &
O'Brien, Activity at Bank, supra note 7; Raymond Bonner, Russian Gangsters Exploit Capitalism
To Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1999, § 1, at 1.
105. See Sultzer, supra note 100, at 148-51; see also U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at
137-38; Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 167-68 (1994).
106. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 167; Sultzer, supra note 100, at 149. Consolidation is
particularly necessary for laundering of drug proceeds, because the physical volume of the notes
exceeds the volume of the drugs. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 167 n.28.
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outside the United States via electronic transfer or physical transport.10 7
During the layering phase, funds are deposited in a bank in a haven
jurisdiction - so called because the jurisdiction enforces bank secrecy
and permits anonymous shell corporations - then transferred to the local
branch of a reputable international, often European, bank.' 0 8 During the
integration phase, funds are wired from the branch to the main bank,
then returned to the United States for use as apparently legitimate
funds. i09
Recognizing this international aspect, the United States has worked
to develop a multilateral assault against money laundering. It has helped
create a sophisticated network of law-enforcement cooperation."l 0 It
spearheaded negotiation and adoption of the 1988 U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,III
and has conditioned receipt of foreign aid on compliance." 2 Parties to
the convention promise to enact domestic criminal laws against launder-
ing of drug proceeds;" 3 to prosecute or extradite those suspected of
money laundering in another state;" 4 to identify, trace, and seize illegal
proceeds; 1 5 and to assist other states' investigations." 16 European states
107. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 167; Sultzer, supra note 100, at 149.
108. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 167-68; Sultzer, supra note 100, at 150-51.
109. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 168; Sultzer, supra note 100, at 151.
110. For discussions of the extent of international law-enforcement cooperation against
money laundering, drug trafficking, and other transnational crimes, see, e.g., Diane Marie Amann,
A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context,
45 UCLA L. REv. 1201, 1261-72 (1998) [hereinafter Amann, Whipsaw]; Zagaris, supra note 101.
111. 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)
[hereinafter U.N. Drug-Trafficking Convention]. Cf. Gilmore, supra note 57, at ix (stating that
"[s]ustained international interest in money laundering" arose out of concerns about drug traffick-
ing); J.A.E. Vervaele, La saisie et la confiscation ci la suite d'atteintes punissables au droit aux
Etats-Unis, 78 REVUE DE DROIT PNAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 974, 975 (1988) (attributing devel-
opment of this multilateral convention to U.S. influence).
112. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2429b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing denial of foreign
aid unless a country is certified as having implemented requisite measures against drug trafficking
and money laundering). This provision has been used against Colombia. See Zagaris, supra note
101, at 1408-11.
113. U.N. Drug-Trafficking Convention, art. 3(1).
114. See id., art. 4 (imposing duty to "establish ... jurisdiction over" offender "present in its
territory" whom it "does not extradite.., to another Party"), art. 6 (stating that money laundering
shall be an extraditable offense).
115. Id., art. 5.
116. U.N. Drug-Trafficking Convention, art. 7(1). The convention's stated purpose, "to de-
prive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby
eliminate their main incentive for so doing," reflects a goal of domestic laws against money laun-
dering. See supra text accompanying note 49.
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soon concluded a similar, regional convention to combat the laundering
not just of drug proceeds, but of all criminal activity.' 1 7
In 1989, the United States joined six other major industrial nations
to form the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a Paris-based clearing-
house for money-laundering regulation. 18 The FATF works with other
agencies, including Interpol,' 19 and conducts research on the nature and
extent of money laundering. I2 ° It also monitors implementation by its
members of its "40 Recommendations." 121 These posit a two-pronged
attack similar to the U.S. statutory scheme. Reflecting the Money Laun-
dering Control Act, the 40 Recommendations call for stronger criminal
laws against money laundering.122  Reflecting the Bank Secrecy Act,
they call for an end to financial confidentiality and for imposition of
reporting duties on banks. 123
117. See Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991)
[hereinafter European Laundering Convention]. For another measure within the same region, see
Council Directive of June 10, 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the pur-
pose of money-laundering, 91/308 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77; Terry Corbitt, Collecting Evidence of
Fraud and Money Laundering, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE , May 8, 1999, at 372 (describing nearly
universal compliance with directive). Additional regional measures have been launched in the
British Commonwealth and in the Americas. See INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY
LAUNDERING 157-64, 271-335 (W.C. Gilmore ed., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS].
118. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ANNUAL REPORT 1998-
1999 (July 2, 1999) (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/99ar-en.pdf> [hereinaf-
ter FATF REPORT].
119. See FATF REPORT, supra note 118, at 6 (discussing cooperation with Interpol, the
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, the Council of Europe, and the
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission). Interpol, the International Crime Police Or-
ganization, coordinates enforcement efforts and also provides technical assistance and training in
detection of money laundering. See Amann, Whipsaw, supra note 110, at 1266.
120. See FATF REPORT, supra note 118, at 4-6. A similar task force has been established for
the Caribbean region. See Cleaning Up?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1999, at 78 (discussing formation
in 1992 of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, pursuant to a U.N. program). To reduce
the number of Caribbean havens, the United Kingdom recently conditioned a new status for its
overseas territories on implementation of anti-money-laundering measures and fuller cooperation
with outside'law-enforcement agencies. Id.
121. See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations
of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, With Interpretative Notes, 35 I.L.M.
1291 (1996) [hereinafter 40 Recommendations], discussed in FATF REPORT, supra note 118, at 6-
27. Members include the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as
twenty-six governments, including Hong Kong and Switzerland, considered major money-laun-
dering centers. See FATF REPORT, supra note 118, at 6. In 1999, FATF invited Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico to join as observers. See id. at 35.
122. Compare 40 Recommendations, supra note 121, at 1294-1300 with supra notes 78-101
and accompanying text. Many countries, although few in the developing world, have adopted
laws against money laundering since the mid-1980s. U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 137
(stating that "many" developing countries had "expressed the willingness to do so").
123. Compare 40 Recommendations, supra note 121, at 1296-98 with supra notes 59-77 and
accompanying text.
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Abolition of bank secrecy is, in fact, a common aspect of transna-
tional efforts against money laundering.' 24 The United States, in partic-
ular, has persuaded countries like Switzerland, where constitutionally
guaranteed bank secrecy had developed in part to protect Jewish assets
against Nazi incursions, 125 to adopt stiff anti-money-laundering laws and
to appoint prosecutors eager to enforce them. 126 The United States also
has resisted establishment of new haven jurisdictions. 27 It promises to
continue such pressure. 128
III. A BETrER WAY?
Throughout this last century, perceived increases in organized
crime produced pressure for greater federal enforcement of old and new
penal laws. Out of concerns about bootlegging syndicates came the
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, parent to the Hobbs Act of 1948.129 Re-
ports that crime families had infiltrated legitimate businesses spurred
passage of RICO in 1970.130 Recognition that drug traffickers needed to
cleanse their illegal proceeds prompted enactment of two domestic statu-
tory schemes and several international measures against money
laundering. 131
124. U.N. and European conventions, for instance, both forbid a state from refusing to aid
another member's money-laundering investigation on account of domestic bank-secrecy laws.
See U.N. Drug-Trafficking Convention, supra note 11l, arts. 5, 7(1); European Laundering Con-
vention, supra note 117, arts. 4, 18(7). The latter provision, however, permits a state to seek
judicial authorization to lift bank secrecy, if domestic laws so require. See European Laundering
Convention, supra note 117, art. 18(7).
125. See Olson, supra note 4 (stating that Switzerland originally justified bank secrecy as a
means to "stave off Nazi inquiries into accounts maintained by Jewish and other refugees"); see
also Michele Moser, Note, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy Laws Aimed at Money
Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 323, 323-24 (1995) (discussing
legal sources of Swiss tradition). But see John M. Ferguson, Comment, Swiss Bank Account
"Secrecy" Today: More Holes Than Cheese, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1131, 1135-36 (1998)
(asserting that Swiss secrecy aided Nazi war effort).
126. See, e.g., Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank Secrecy with Comparative Aspects to the
American Approach, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 865, 870-71 (1998) (discussing Swiss penal laws
adopted in 1990); Ferguson, supra note 125, at 1139 (discussing U.S. influence).
127. See Michael Allen, U.S., Antigua Duel on Money Laundering, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27,
1999, at A19 (quoting U.S. ambassador to Antigua as saying "'the U.S. has to chop down one of
the first independent countries to make the switch to offshore banking'" in explaining U.S. criti-
cism that new Antiguan rules are insufficient to curb money laundering).
128. See Treasury, Justice Unveil New Strategy to Combat Money Laundering Schemes, 68
U.S.L.W. 2182, at 2184 (Oct. 5, 1999) (stating that report submitted in September 1999 to House
Banking Committee "calls for government officials to work to improve international cooperation
and to intensify pressure on lax jurisdictions to implement strict money laundering controls")
[hereinafter Treasury, Justice].
129. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
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RICO signaled an especially far-reaching attack. Its primary goal
was to prevent organized crime from penetrating legitimate entities;
therefore, it targeted entire criminal organizations.132 This unique ap-
proach continues to draw fire. As this article has shown, critics have
assailed RICO on a variety of fronts. 133 Some complain that RICO per-
mits convictions for behavior that falls within a broadly interpreted, less-
than-clear, scope, and thus undermines individual liberty. Furthermore,
RICO's breadth has inspired many civil lawsuits challenging behavior
unrelated to the traditional notions of organized crime that had prompted
enactment of the statute. Others argue that RICO is too complex, that
requiring a preliminary finding of a pattern of predicate offenses, then a
finding of a connection between that pattern and defendant's activities,
prolongs investigations and confuses trials. Critics question both
whether RICO has been effective in combating organized crime, and
whether it is necessary given the subsequent proliferation of federal laws
authorizing harsh punishment for what were once considered less seri-
ous offenses.
Among those offenses now subject to stiff federal penalties is
money laundering. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 were designed to discourage criminals
by impeding their enjoyment of the profits of their illegal activities. 34
Such laws represent an additional tool for domestic prosecution. 135 Like
RICO, these laws were intended to protect legitimate businesses; specifi-
cally, legitimate financial institutions. 36 Recently that goal has ex-
132. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 21-48.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
135. One recent and not uncommon example is a case in which prosecutors settled a criminal
case against the head of a defunct charity, who had faced separate civil suits alleging false adver-
tising and unfair business practices, by permitting him to plead guilty to structuring, for failing to
report 282 cash deposits totaling more than $1.7 million in one year. See Bill Wallace, Used-Car
Rabbi Admits Violating Currency Law, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 1999, at A28; Eric Brazil, Rabbi
guilty of money laundering, S.F. ExAM, Dec. 16, 1999, at A25.
136. See U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 142 (asserting that "perhaps the single most
significant impact of money laundering on the legitimate economy is that it undermines the integ-
rity of the financial system"); CASTELLS, supra note 56, at 201 (asserting that the movement of
illegal funds "has become an important source of destabilization of international finance and capi-
tal markets"); Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, December
1988 Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering, 4 (" 'Public confidence in banks, and hence their stability, can be undermined by
adverse publicity as a result of inadvertent association with criminals .. ), reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 117, at 274. See also supra text accompanying note 57. One
article reported that the Russian Mafia "has moved about $27 billion through the banking system"
of Switzerland, and controls "some 300 companies" based there. Agence-France Presse, Tracing
Funds Harder Than Ever, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1999, § 1, at 12.
[Vol. 27:199
HeinOnline  -- 27 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 213 2000
2000] Spotting Money Launderers 219
panded. Policymakers in the United States and abroad herald anti-
money-laundering laws as a means to stop the current criminal bugbear,
political corruption.' 37 Thus, international treaties now oblige parties to
make bribery of a foreign official a predicate offense in their domestic
anti-money-laundering laws. ' 38
Countries continue to band together to investigate, prosecute, and
punish those who violate broad proscriptions against the laundering of
the proceeds of crime.' 39 They have adopted anti-money-laundering
laws more readily than RICO counterparts; thus, unlike with RICO, no
double criminality problem precludes cooperation.' 40 Indeed, the global
fight against money laundering has captured the popular imagination, as
the abundance of stories about the Bank of New York scandal attests. 14'
Given this ascendance, it seems appropriate to assess anti-money-
laundering measures in light of the critique of RICO. Are these mea-
sures more narrow and less complex? Do they pose any threat to lib-
erty? Are they effective? To these questions, this article now turns.
137. See, e.g., Erick Eckholm, China to End Bank Secrecy In Effort Against Corruption,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000, at AI0; Eric Schmitt, Republicans Step Up Attack On Clinton's Russia
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at A8; Bonner & O'Brien, Activity at Bank, supra note 7. In
the wake of allegations that funds laundered through the Bank of New York were linked to politi-
cal corruption in Russia, U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers announced proposals for
additional regulation by stating, "'Money laundering may look like a polite form of white-collar
crime. But it is the companion of brutality, deceit and corruption.'" Eric Schmitt, State Depart-
ment Expert Upbeat About Russian Fund Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at A13. Proposed
domestic legislation would make it a crime for U.S. banks to handle the proceeds of corruption by
officials overseas. See Jeff Gerth, U.S. May Bar Illicit Funds In Deposits By Foreigners, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A10 [hereinafter Gerth, U.S. May Bar].
138. See Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, art. 13,
E.T.S. No. 173, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 505, 508 (1999) (requiring parties to adopt penal laws
against laundering of foreign or domestic bribery proceeds); Argentina-Brazil-Bulgaria-Chile-
Slovak Republic-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, art. 7, Dec. 18,
1997, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1, 10 (1998) (similar provision).
139. See Michael Brindle, Money laundering, tax and the criminal law, AMIcus CURIAE,
July 1999, at 5 (stating that Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 93A (Eng.), enacted through Criminal
Justice Act, 1993, §§ 29-31 (Eng.), "clearly goes well beyond money laundering in the ordinary
sense," in that it "extends to all indictable offences").
140. See Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1422-30 (discussing recent law-enforcement efforts to
smooth this obstacle to cooperation in the area of complex crimes).
141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. That the image of money laundering reso-
nates is evident in efforts to categorize financial crimes as money laundering, even if prosecutors
choose not to charge a violation of the Money Laundering Control Act. See infra note 152 and
accompanying text (discussing charges in the Bank of New York case); see also Brazil, supra note
135 (quoting federal judge's statement in a different case that crime to which defendant pleaded
"is technically structuring currency transactions," but that "it is 'otherwise known as money
laundering"').
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A. Are Anti-Money-Laundering Laws More Narrow and Less
Complex Than RICO?
Laws against money laundering seek to hit criminals in a vulnera-
ble spot - the pocketbook - on the theory that enjoyment of illegal prof-
its is a primary motive for organized criminals. 142 In contrast to RICO,
the focus of these laws is on criminal proceedings. 143 And they permit
litigation only by the government, thus eliminating the abusive private
lawsuits that have dogged RICO. 44 The anti-money-laundering laws
thus appear to improve on RICO's more diffuse approach.
Nonetheless, these laws, like RICO, do not directly attack harmful
criminal behavior. They act as proxies, providing means to pursue and
punish individuals whose underlying crimes cannot be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Like RICO, these laws remain overbroad. The BSA's
mandatory reporting requirements have created a database of 100 mil-
lion CTRs, mostly of innocent transactions.1 45 Although the U.S. Trea-
sury has cut back on reporting requirements, 46 it has expanded greatly
the types of businesses that must register with it.14 7 The MLCA, mean-
while, includes as predicate offenses many crimes not within the pur-
view of RICO. 148 Proposed legislation would add to this already long
list more crimes committed abroad, including fraud, bribery of officials,
misappropriation of public funds, arms trafficking, and violent
crimes. 149
The anti-money-laundering laws do seem less complex than RICO.
They do not, for instance, require proof of some amorphous pattern of
racketeering. The BSA is particularly straightforward, simply stating a
proscribed act, such as failure to report, and a proscribed state of mind,
knowledge. 150
The MLCA, however, has a compound structure not unlike that of
RICO. To secure a conviction for money laundering, prosecutors need
142. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 78-79.
145. See Gary J. Kruchten, The Bank Secrecy Act: A Powerful Weapon for Law Enforce-
ment, 68 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., 1999 WL 14948089 (Aug. 1, 1999).
146. See supra text accompanying note 76.
147. See Treasury Releases Long-Awaited Rule To Snuff Out Money Laundering at Non-
banks, 68 U.S.L.W. 2121-22 (Aug. 31, 1999) (reporting on release of Treasury regulations ex-
tending registration requirements to "money services businesses, such as check cashing firms,
money transmitters, providers of money orders, and foreign exchange agents").
148. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
149. See Treasury, Justice, supra note 127, at 2184. The MCLA now limits foreign predi-
cates to a few offenses, such as drug trafficking, arson, kidnapping, and bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(7)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
150. See supra text accompanying note 64; see also infra note 159 and accompanying text.
220 [Vol. 27:199
HeinOnline  -- 27 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 215 2000
2000] Spotting Money Launderers
to prove: that the defendant conducted the requisite transaction; that she
did so in a manner intended to conceal illegal proceeds; and that the
proceeds derived from some specified unlawful offense. This combina-
tion makes money laundering "a difficult crime to prove."' 51 Perhaps
emblematic of this is the fact that although the Bank of New York mat-
ter has been called a money-laundering scandal, the first indictments did
not allege money laundering. 152 Rather, defendants were charged with
illegal operation of a money-transfer business.153 Observers predicted it
would be difficult to prove at trial that the funds, at least some of which
stem from activities legal in Russia, constituted the proceeds of unlawful
activity. 154
B. Do They Pose Any Threat to Liberty?
This expected difficulty in discerning licit from illicit funds points
to a sinister effect of anti-money-laundering measures: ever-greater in-
cursion of the government into the private affairs of law-abiding individ-
uals and businesses.
Some transactions disfavored in the United States are encouraged
elsewhere. 55 Even in the United States some business deals, such as
creation of tax shelters, may tread close to, yet within, the line of legal-
ity.' 56 To paraphrase Professor Lynch's criticism of RICO, even if the
151. U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 137.
152. Timothy L. O'Brien, Bank of New York Ex-Employee Charged in Russian Case, N.Y.
Timris, Dec. 1, 1999, at A8 ("The charges ... fall short of money laundering charges, which are
typically difficult to prove.") [hereinafter O'Brien, Ex-Employee]. Eventually, however, the initial
defendants did plead guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. See Robert O'Harrow Jr.,
Ex-Banker Admits Guilt in Scheme, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at A01.
153. See O'Brien & Bonner, Indictment, supra note 7 (reporting charges of conspiracy to
transmit funds and receive deposits illegally and of operation of an illegal money-transmittal busi-
ness); Jeff Leeds, Indictment Issued in N.Y. Bank Probe, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al (stating
that defendants' business allegedly did not have required New York license).
154. See O'Brien & Bergman, supra note 104 (reporting investigators' comments that "part
of the money is from ordinary wire transfers and tax avoidance, much of which is perfectly legal
in Russia, while some may be tied to organized crime, corporate embezzlement or political graft,"
and that "proof of the latter can only be unearthed by Russian authorities"); see also Leeds, supra
note 153 (stating that much of the money "may be capital legally sent out of the country by
Russia's business and political elite").
155. See Cleaning Up?, supra note 120, at 78 (indicating that even those offshore bankers
who subscribe to efforts against laundering of drug proceeds resist characterization of participa-
tion in "tax competition" as money laundering).
156. Cf. U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 137:
Views vary regarding which activities account for the highest proportion of money laun-
dered in global terms - large-scale tax evasion and secuities fraud certainly rely on sys-
tems of financial secrecy, but the extent to which these activities constitute money
laundering is highly speculative. There is an important difference between capital in flight
which has been earned legitimately, and capital from criminal activities - in the former
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anti-money-laundering statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, the un-
certainty of what they permit ought to cause consternation, given the
harsh penalties that money-laundering convictions carry. 157
The line may be crossed simply by a jury's determination that the
defendant acted with the requisite mens rea. The anti-money-laundering
statutes specify what appear to be stringent state-of-mind requirements.
But judicial interpretation has diluted them significantly; for example,
by permitting convictions based on willful blindness and aggregate
knowledge.15 8 Moreover, when the Supreme Court gave a protective
construction to "willfulness," the state of mind required for illegal struc-
turing of a transaction, Congress immediately deleted the term from the
anti-structuring statute. 159 Thus a banker or merchant who is simply
greedy, or stupid, and who has no actual knowledge of the source of the
funds offered, may be held guilty of money laundering. 160 The mens rea
requirement serves the interest in a fair criminal justice system by mak-
ing sure that only those who are morally culpable, who have no accept-
able excuse, are punished.1 6 Because it undermines this aid to fairness,
the dilution of mens rea in the anti-money-laundering statutes is
disturbing. 162
case the aim is temporary concealment of capital, whereas the process of money launder-
ing implies concealment of the illicit origin of capital in order to render it useable.
157. See supra text accompanying note 21. Judicial challenges to these statutes on vague-
ness grounds have failed. See, e.g., Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d at 726-27 (holding that MLCA is not
void for vagueness as applied to used-car dealer who transacted business with a buyer who desired
to conceal illegal proceeds); United States v. Scanio, 705 F. Supp. 768, 773-76 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)
(rejecting argument that term "structuring" in 31 U.S.C. § 5324 is unconstitutionally vague).
158. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
159. Compare Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (holding that "willfulness," the
prerequisite for imposition of criminal penalties pursuant to the then-current version of 31 U.S.C.
§5322(a), required proof that defendant knew structuring was illegal) with 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)
(1994) (stating that "whoever violates" the structuring statute is guilty, without requiring the vio-
lation to be willful).
160. See Henning, supra note 46, at 1333-34 ("a businessperson's willingness to turn a blind
eye has been transformed into proof of the defendant's intent to commit the crime of money
laundering"). For a critique asserting that private attorneys are not sufficiently insulated from
prosecution for money laundering on account of their receipt of clients' fees, see Barry Tarlow,
Reminding Federal Prosecutors to Play by Their Own Rules in Money Laundering Investigations,
THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1999, at 52.
161. Compare JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 72-73 (2d ed. 1960)
(stating that only morally culpable conduct deserves punishment) with H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 37-40 (1968) (asserting link between fairness of punishment and requirement
that defendant "acted 'voluntarily'"). Accord V WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 21 (St.
George Tucker ed., 1969) (orig. pub. 1803) ("[T]o constitute a crime against human laws, there
must be, first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vitious will.")
162. Accord Edward M. Wise, Foreword: The International Association of Penal Law and
the Problem of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1281, 1301-02 (1998) (criticizing U.S.-led
trend toward attenuation of mens rea requirements as means of fighting organized crime); Koenig,
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It is not that long ago that ordinary individuals could deposit cash,
purchase automobiles, or wire money without inviting government at-
tention. That is no longer the case. Decades of mandated currency
transaction reporting have provided the government with 100 million
reports containing detailed information on individuals. 163 As an FBI
bulletin recognizes, this database now comprises "a wealth of informa-
tion that law enforcement can use in any criminal investigation where
suspects have access to large sums of money."'164
Laws against money laundering further impose significant record-
keeping and reporting burdens on entities that handle large sums of
money. These burdens are being expanded, in fact, to include lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals.1 65 The banking industry, which
first felt the weight of the anti-money-laundering laws, has issued a re-
port estimating that government money-laundering regulations cost it
$10 billion dollars a year.' 66 Know-your-customer rules and Suspicious
Activity Reports, moreover, conscript banks into the ranks of law en-
forcement by ordering them to scrutinize their clients' behavior at the
government's behest. 167  Such rules, which one congressional critic
called "'big brotherism,"' are a far cry from the bank secrecy that was
tradition not so long ago.' 68
The U.S.-led pressure for worldwide abolition of bank secrecy is
but one example of another feature of anti-money-laundering laws that
threatens liberty; that is, their international appeal. The MLCA, the pri-
supra note 38, at 1377 (stating that purported "solutions" to organized crime "have threatened to
change the nature of the system of criminal justice in the United States by greatly increasing the
reach of the criminal law and enhancing sentences, while lessening the mens rea requirements").
Cf. Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2402, 2402, 2416-18 (1998)
(arguing that courts should construe mens rea narrowly in federal statutes to avert the "dangers of
excessive federalization of the criminal law").
163. See Kruchten, supra note 145.
164. Id.
165. See U.S. Treasury Form 8300, discussed supra note 75; see also Corbitt, supra note
117, at 371 (noting that British accountants must report clients they believe have laundered pro-
ceeds of tax evasion and other financial crimes, and that the European Commission soon may
impose similar requirements on lawyers, estate agents, and other professionals).
166. See Money Laundering Hotline, 7 No. 6 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 5, 5 (Jan. 1997)
[hereinafter Money Laundering Hotline].
167. See Hall, supra note 61, at 659 (stating that these rules "delegat[e] almost prosecutorial
discretion to the reporting bank to interpret the law, analyze conduct, describe the elements of
conduct constituting a prosecutable offense, and to suggest future investigation").
168. Michael Allen, Banking Authorities Likely to Abandon Proposal to Thwart Money
Laundering, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1999, at A4 (quoting U.S. Rep. George Gekas). An industry-
led protest, in the form of 30,000 letters and e-mails, prompted U.S. officials to back off a pro-
posed new know-your-customer rule. See id. Accord Sanna Heikinheimo, Money Laundering - a
Controversial Issue, 37 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 211, 219 (1996) ("[A]re the banks eventually
to be transformed from being the servants of their customers to being spies for the government?").
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mary U.S. anti-money-laundering statute, explicitly authorizes extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction against money laundering.1 69 Recent legislation in
the United Kingdom likewise casts an extraterritorial net. 170 And de-
spite the Restatement's approval of hesitation in the exercise of extrater-
ritorial criminal jurisdiction,' 71 the international nature of money
laundering renders such exercise commonplace. At the same time, a
trilogy of recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions suggests that the rights
that individuals accused of domestic crimes enjoy do not fully constrain
the investigative activities of U.S. agents overseas.172 The unsettled na-
ture of the rights of the accused in the transnational context is cause for
concern. 
1 73
This is especially the case given that transnational efforts against
organized crime often entail intrusive crime-fighting measures. The
longstanding wall between intelligence and law-enforcement agents, for
169. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(f), 1957(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), discussed supra note 100
and accompanying text.
170. See Brindle, supra note 139, at 6 (stating that the "most remarkable feature" of Crimi-
nal Justice Act, 1988, § 93A (Eng.) enacted through Criminal Justice Act, 1993, §§ 29-31 (Eng.)
"is its extension . . . to the facilitation of criminal conduct taking place outside the UK ...
[R]emarkably it is not necessary that the conduct taking place abroad should actually constitute
criminal conduct there, only that it would constitute an indictable offense if it had occurred in
England and Wales, or Scotland.").
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
rptr. n.8 (1987) (stating that "the exercise of criminal (as distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in
relation to acts committed in another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive," and thus
"[i]t is generally accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal
jurisdiction over activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly ..
and only upon strong justification").
172. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that a witness in a U.S. court
may not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination out of fear that his
compelled testimony would be used in a foreign prosecution); United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that a Mexican defendant kidnapped by Mexican agents at the
request of U.S. agents must stand trial in U.S. court); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990) (declining to extend constitutional protection to a noncitizen defendant against
whom the U.S. government intended to introduce evidence obtained in a warrantless search in
Mexico).
173. Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1448 (stating that transnational cases "will bring into play
the potential applicability of the various rights guaranteed by the U.S. Bill of Rights or applicable
provisions of international human rights conventions," and increase "tension between the need for
the United States to cooperate more with national governments and international tribunals and the
concern for the fulfillment of constitutional and international human rights standards"). See gen-
erally Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an
International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809 (2000) (analyzing international trends toward and away
from shared values regarding rights of the accused); Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Ac-
cused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. (forthcoming 2000) (expres-
sing concern about whether individual rights will be honored in transnational cases).
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example, has crumbled; 174 indeed, it was British intelligence that di-
rected law enforcement to the laundering of funds at the Bank of New
York.175  A "favorite" of law enforcement is the undercover money-
laundering operation, which may result in convictions of individuals
proved to have engaged in crime with no one but a government agent. 176
Such sting operations are expressly authorized both in the MLCA and in
the U.N. convention against drug-trafficking.177 Electronic surveillance
is another frequent tactic. 178 Other examples are U.S. proposals to fight
transnational crime by increasing the government's power to decode en-
crypted messages, to seize and forfeit assets, and to conduct warrantless
searches of mail. 179 The prevalence of such techniques, not only in the
United States, but also abroad, 180 clearly encroaches on individual
autonomy. 18'
Occasionally, countries outside the United States resist such efforts.
In its outrage that an unauthorized sting operation had been conducted
on its soil, for example, Mexico initially threatened to prosecute U.S.
174. Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1413-14 (describing trend to more use of intelligence infor-
mation, and asserting that the U.S. Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1997, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 401-404g (West 1991 & Supp. 1999) "constitutes a fundamental breach in the tradi-
tional separation of intelligence and law enforcement").
175. See Bombshell expos6 of Russian ties to BONY bares virgin laundering soil, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Oct. 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Bombshell].
176. See Sultzer, supra note 100, at 183-84, n.242. Such sting operations may cost law
enforcement $40,000 a month or more. See id. at 184.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (1994) (permitting conviction for money laundering with
U.S. undercover agent); U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 111, art. 11 (pledging to
permit controlled delivery as technique to combat drug trafficking).
178. See European Laundering Convention, supra note 117, arts. 2 & 3 (authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance as means of fighting money laundering).
179. See Treasury, Justice, supra note 128, at 2184 (describing report recommending that
U.S. Customs Service be permitted "to conduct warrantless border searches" of "outbound first-
class mail" and discussing soon-to-be-introduced legislation that would "provide new authority to
investigate and punish violence against U.S. nationals abroad, strengthen border security, deny
safe haven to international criminals, seize and forfeit the assets of international criminals, and
address international computer crimes"); Jeri Clausing, In a Reversal, White House Will End
Data-Encryption Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999 (explaining that Clinton Administra-
tion long has argued that encryption will make it harder to fight terrorism and drug trafficking, but
that, in the face of opposition from the high-technology industry and from privacy-advocacy
groups, officials had retreated from demands for a "back-door key to unscramble encrypted com-
munications when they suspect a crime has been committed").
180. Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1421 (stating that through use of liaison officers and other
cooperative efforts, United States has spurred other countries' adoption of proactive techniques).
181. See generally Paul Marcus, The Challenge of Prosecuting Organized Crime in the
United States: Procedural Issues, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1379 (1998) (describing U.S. laws permit-
ting undercover operations and electronic surveillance, and expressing concern about consequent
invasions of privacy).
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undercover agents. 182 And a Canadian court refused to extradite an indi-
vidual caught in a U.S. money-laundering sting, because Canada does
not permit such operations. 18 3 Many countries, however, have come to
tolerate, if not embrace, intrusive investigative and prosecutorial
methods. 184
C. Are They Effective?
Law enforcement always involves a balancing of costs and benefits.
Perhaps, then, concerns about the extent and intrusiveness of laws
against money laundering might be allayed if the laws indeed curbed
crime.
Standing alone, the Bank Secrecy Act fails this test. Its focus on
cash simply invites laundering by creative transactions.18 5 Even with
regard to cash transactions, the sheer amount of information produced
by compliance with the BSA makes it unlikely that the paper trail alone
will flag a suspect. In 1997 alone, more than 12 million CTRs were
filed, a volume that precluded quick detection of money launderers. 186
Although the number of Suspicious Activity Reports is lower, about
100,000,187 this also represents an enormous amount of information.
Such reporting thus will continue to produce evidence of money laun-
182. See Stanley Meisler, Albright Urges Mexico to Drop Threat in Drug Sting Diplomacy,
L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A4. Although these threats came to naught, relations between the
United States reportedly remained strained. See Golden, Mexican Banks, supra note 5; accord
Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1415-16 (citing occasional "tension" between Mexico over U.S.
agents' violations of its laws). Forty of the 100 people indicted in this sting operation have been
captured. Thirty-one of those have pleaded guilty. The rest stood trial; three were acquitted.
Recently, a judge overturned one of the remaining six convictions on the ground that the defen-
dant banker had been entrapped. See David Rosenzweig, Judge Throws Out Laundering Verdict,
L.A. Times, July 20, 2000, at B1.
183. See United States v. Dynar, Nos. C18577, C19744, 1995 C.C.C. Lexis 2434, at *12-*13
(Ont. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1995), discussed in Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1431-32; see also Zagaris,
supra note 101, at 1415-16 (discussing St. Kitts magistrate's refusal of U.S. request for extradition
of drug-trafficking suspect because investigators had used wiretaps in contravention of St. Kitts
law).
184. See Zagaris, supra note 101, at 1413-15 (discussing effect of U.S. policies on other
countries); id. at 1420 (describing particularly close cooperation with Italy). U.S. pressure has,
however, sparked some resentment abroad. See, e.g., Cleaning Up?, supra note 120, at 78
("Others claim, sotto voce, that they are taking the blame for America's failed war on drugs. The
loss of privacy demanded by all these regulators and policemen comes at a price."); vAN DUYNE,
supra note 57, at 114 (describing U.S. anti-money-laundering policy as "intrusive").
185. See United States v. Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction for
causing failure to file requisite report, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1), on ground that
because checks, and not cash, were deposited, bank's duty to file a CTR never was triggered).
186. See Allen, U.S. to Cut, supra note 76.
187. See David Overlock Stewart & Marc E. Sorini, Suspicious Activity Reporting for Casi-
nos: The Next Wave in Currency Reporting, reprinted in ABA Center for Continuing Legal Edu-
cation National Institute, Gaming Enforcement II: Criminal Justice, Apr. 16-17, 1998, at D-31.
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dering only after a more conventional method has provoked an
investigation. 188
The Money Laundering Control Act resolves some of these
problems. It is concerned with all kinds of financial transactions, and it
expressly contemplates proactive law-enforcement efforts such as sting
operations. 189 "Unlike RICO's attempt to protect legitimate businesses
from organized crime," Professor Peter J. Henning has written, "the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 has been much more effective
in attacking the supporting infrastructure of organized crime."' 90 This
may be true relative to RICO. In absolute terms, however, the success
of anti-money-laundering measures has been modest.
On the domestic front, U.S. Department of Justice figures show that
from 1987 to 1995, only 3,000 money-laundering cases, against 7,300
defendants, were filed, yielding 580 guilty verdicts and 2,295 guilty
pleas.' 9 1 And although concerns about international laundering of drug
proceeds prompted passage of the MLCA, U.S. laws seldom are used
against this type of laundering. 192 Thus other commentators have char-
acterized federal prosecutions against money laundering as relatively un-
usual and largely unsuccessful. 3
On the international front the situation is no better. Despite ad-
vances in international cooperation, enforcement has been described as
"sporadic and inconsistent,"' 194 and "less than adequate."' 195 Transna-
tional evidence-gathering remains difficult; this well may hamper further
prosecutions in the Bank of New York case. 196 Some countries have yet
188. Accord Allen, U.S. to Cut, supra note 76 (stating that filing of 35 million CTRs in
recent three-year period "swamped" authorities, and resulted in fewer than 1,000 investigations
based on reports alone); Stewart & Sorini, supra note 187, at D-31 (describing post hoc use of
CTR data).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81, 99.
190. Henning, supra note 46, at 1329.
191. See Money Laundering Hotline, supra note 166, at 5.
192. See Jimmy Gurud, The 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances - A Ten Year Perspective: Is International Cooperation Merely
Illusory?, 22 FoRDHAM INr'L L.J. 74, 104-05 (1998) (concluding that only twenty-three cases in
previous ten years, or fewer than three cases a year, involved international drug money
laundering).
193. See Barbot, supra note 105, at 193.
194. Guruld, supra note 192, at 85.
195. FATF REPORT, supra note 118, at 31.
196. See Bombshell, supra note 175, at El (reporting "that top Russian leaders have not been
quick to lend a helping hand"); Sharon LaFraniere, Bank Probe Up to Russian Investigators,
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at El (predicting that because of complexity of case and "relative
inexperience" of Russian agents, "the case may end up with no major prosecutions"); Treasury,
Justice, supra note 128 (quoting U.S. Department of Justice official's report of "'considerable
difficulty in obtaining evidence from Russia and other countries"'). Late last year the U.S. gov-
ernment postponed the first Bank of New York case because of difficulty obtaining jurisdiction
20001
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to enact strong anti-money-laundering laws, and others are lax in en-
forcement. 197 Money launderers prey on emerging markets and weak
legal systems, 198 though even in places as established as London, money
laundering appears rampant.1 99
Nor can one expect prompt improvement. Law-enforcement offi-
cials themselves complain that anti-money-laundering measures have
not kept pace with technological developments. 200 The fluidity of capi-
tal in international markets also opens new means of laundering. 20' In-
stead of bringing the leaders of criminal organizations within the grasp
of law enforcement, anti-money-laundering efforts appear to have en-
trenched a new layer of intermediaries: accountants, bankers, and law-
yers who receive commissions of up to 20 percent to do the dirty work
of making money clean. 20 2 Even for otherwise law-abiding bankers, the
monetary incentives to relax know-your-customer controls, to look the
other way, are enormous. In the Radll Salinas and the Bank of New
York cases, those incentives appear to have been irresistible. 20 3
over the London-based defendants. See O'Brien, Ex-Employee, supra note 152. The defendants
later flew voluntarily to New York and entered guilty pleas. O'Brien & Bonner, Banker and
Husband, supra note 7, at A6.
197. See Guruld, supra note 192, at 85 ("in many cases, parties have failed to enforce anti-
money laundering laws aggressively"); Corbitt, supra note 117, at 372 (citing European Commis-
sion report indicating that law enforcement fails to react appropriately to reports of suspicious
transactions); Gerth, U.S. May Bar, supra note 137 (stating that a "culture of secrecy" maintained
by "some private bankers," as well as bank secrecy in remaining haven jurisdictions, hampered
anti-money-laundering efforts).
198. See U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 141-42.
199. See Cleaning Up?, supra note 120, at 78 ("So much money passes through the City of
London, the world's biggest foreign exchange, that the State Department ranks Britain ahead of
many offshore centres as being 'of primary concern."').
200. See Treasury, Justice, supra note 128 (quoting statement by U.S. Department of Justice
official that laws "'are not keeping up with developments in the techniques of international
crimes' ").
201. See Cleaning Up?, supra note 120, at 78 (citing FATF report that "no sooner has one
loophole been closed than another opens").
202. See U.N. DRUG REPORT, supra note 49, at 141. In the words of a 1985 report of a U.S.
Senate committee:
'Money laundering is now an extremely lucrative criminal enterprise in its own right. The
Treasury's investigations have uncovered members of an emerging criminal class - profes-
sional money launderers who aid and abet other criminals through financial activities.
These individuals hardly fit the stereotype of an underworld criminal. This has resulted in
the development of a professional criminal class of money launderers which includes ac-
countants, bankers and lawyers. They need not become involved with the underlying
criminal activity except to conceal and transfer the proceeds that result from it.'
Id.
203. On Salinas, see, e.g., Jeff Gerth, Citigroup Head Concedes Laundering Controls Were
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at A6 (reporting on testimony by co-chairman of Citigroup,
parent of Citibank, that Citibank's controls had been weak); Tim Golden, U.S. Report Says Sali-
nas' Banker Ignored Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at A8 (discussing General Account-
228
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These challenges diminish expectations about the effectiveness of
anti-money-laundering measures. Still, the figure on effectiveness star-
tles. It is estimated that only .0062 of every dollar illegally earned from
drugs - about half a penny - is subjected to governmental removal
actions.2o4
One could challenge the veracity of these statistics. This is a valid
point. The very nature of crime renders statistical analysis little more
than the making of, to borrow a phrase, "estimates in the fog." 20 5 One
also could argue that low clearance of crime is not an uncommon result
of law enforcement.20 6 This, too, is valid. Society should not abandon
all law-enforcement efforts just because they are imperfect.
Nonetheless, when viewed against the backdrop of costs outlined
earlier, the minimal benefit represented by these statistics should raise
alarm. 2° 7 It should militate against waging a war of attrition against
money laundering that causes great collateral damage to the autonomy
of law-abiding individuals and businesses. 20 8 It should counsel for mea-
ing Office report that concluded that Citibank executives had ignored their own anti-money-
laundering safeguards because they were "[e]ager to do business" with Salinas). On the Bank of
New York, see, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Bank's Head Admits Error in Russia Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1999, at A6 (reporting that Bank of New York chairman admitted that bank's controls had
"lapse[d]"); Timothy L. O'Brien & Raymond Bonner, Bank Called Long Unaware Of Vast Money
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at A12 (reporting that "[l]arge sums of money" were
laundered through the bank for at least half a year before drawing the bank's oversight attention).
204. Barbot, supra note 105, at 163 n.8 (quoting HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & GERALD E.
CAIDEN, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 40 (1985)).
205. See VAN DUYNE, supra note 57, at 113. The author used the phrase in criticism of
international law-enforcement efforts to state the magnitude of money laundering. Later he
quoted a Canadian report: "'There is no verifiable method for determining the size of the illicit
economy. Estimated figures in this area of illicit proceeds, however carefully calculated, are only
guesses. Once stated they take on a reality they do not deserve."' Id. at 128 (emphasis supplied
by van Duyne). Perhaps in recognition of such statements, the FATF now is moving slowly
toward setting a dollar figure on the extent of money laundering worldwide. See FATF REPORT,
supra note 118, at 32.
206. Cf. Corbitt, supra note 117, at 372 (quoting "intelligence sources" who argued that
despite appearance of "limited" results of anti-money-laundering laws, "information gathered...
'[w]as more valuable in clearing up crime than prosecutions brought"').
207. The International Association of Penal Law recently sounded such "alarm bells
about the extent to which the world-wide legislative reaction" against organized crime contradicts
"respect for the rule of law and the rights of the accused .. " Wise, supra note 162, at 1301.
1303. Accord CASTELLS, supra note 56, at 203 ("In a desperate reaction to the growing power of
organized crime, democratic states, in self-defense, resort to measures that curtail, and will curtail,
democratic liberties."); Frank C. Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a
Worldwide System of Banking Compliance Programs, J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 277, 277 (1994) (as-
serting that while "increasingly draconian money-laundering statutes" have not "stemmed the flow
of drugs, they have succeeded in invading the financial privacy and individual liberties of
America's citizenry").
208. One must question suggestions, like that in this statement by a European Commission
official, that even incremental gains are sufficient:
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sures to fight money laundering, and all organized crime, that fully re-
spect principles of fair notice and legality, freedom from undue
governmental intrusion, and individual privacy.
IV. A BETTER WAY: RESETTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE NEED TO FIGHT
ORGANIZED CRIME
In many ways the laws against money laundering improve on
RICO. They are more precise and relatively less complex. Yet they,
like RICO and other means of fighting organized crime, post significant
threats to liberty. The effectiveness of anti-money-laundering measures
is less than impressive. A new balance, of law-abiding individuals' right
to be free from undue governmental interference and of governments'
need to curb the laundering of the proceeds of organized crime, is in
order. Measures should be tailored to assure maximal efficacy and mini-
mal intrusion.
A step in the right direction is the recent shift from wholesale,
mandatory currency transaction reporting in favor of more precise Sus-
picious Activity Reports. But as long as these reports are useful only as
post hoc evidence, one must question whether such reporting should be
required. After all, once probable cause centers on a suspect, law en-
forcement can ask a judge for a warrant to examine the suspect's finan-
cial records. This conventional approach protects individual autonomy
to a far greater degree than the mandatory-reporting regime, and with,
perhaps, no less effectiveness. 20 9
Conventional methods should receive greater emphasis in all as-
pects of the fight against organized crime. In stark contrast with RICO,
legislation should be drafted narrowly, in a way that subjects only the
most dangerous criminals to the most severe penalties. Penal laws
should include state-of-mind requirements that serve fairness by making
sure that only blameworthy individuals are punished. Law enforcement
should endeavor first to investigate and prove substantive offenses like
drug trafficking and bribery rather than jump to compound, proxy stat-
utes like RICO and the MLCA. It should attempt conventional means
Increases in cross-frontier movements of cash, the search for laundering possibilities
outside the traditional financial sector and reported increases in the actual cost of money
laundering point to some success in making money laundering more difficult and expen-
sive for organized crime.
Corbitt, supra note 117, at 371-72.
209. Cf. Wise, supra note 162, at 1303 (noting call by International Association of Penal
Law for use of least intrusive law-enforcement techniques and for judicial supervision of intru-
sions on personal liberty or privacy).
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rather than jump to intrusive and expensive tactics, such as sting opera-
tions and electronic surveillance. This new approach should be exported
throughout the globe with the same vigor that accompanied the cam-
paign against money laundering.
Before impressing private businesses into service, before invading
the privacy of individuals, government always should consider whether
the benefit to the public safety is worth the degree of intrusion.
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